Consider two markets of different sizes but similar costs and fare structure. All other things being equal, is an airline's expected revenue larger in the market with larger demand? If not, under what circumstances is it possible to compare expected revenues without carrying out a detailed analysis? In this article, we provide answers to these questions by studying the relationship between the optimal expected revenue and the demand distributions when the latter are comparable according to various stochastic orders. For two-fare class problems with dependent demand we obtain three results. We show that airlines should prefer lesser positive dependence between fare classes when marginal demand distributions are the same. We also describe particular dependence structures under which stochastically larger marginal demand distributions improve optimal expected revenue. Finally, when the dependence between effective demands in the two fare classes arises due to upgrades, we show that stochastically larger marginal demand distributions should be preferred. For a problem with an arbitrary number of fare classes and independent demands, we show that stochastically larger demand distributions should be preferred. Numerical examples demonstrating the effect of parameterized demand distributions (with appropriate stochastic ordering) and dependence structures are also presented.
Introduction
Airlines sell seats on any given flight in multiple fare classes. They also use advertising campaigns and promotions (such as an offer to customers to earn more than the usual number of frequent flyer miles) to increase demand for all fare classes. Assuming that such marketing efforts are successful and that revenue/cost parameters remain invariant, is the airline better off when demand for each fare class is larger? If not, is there a way of comparing demand vectors that guarantees greater expected revenues for the airline? In this paper, we use stochastic comparisons to answer such questions.
Although motivated by real-life situations, the focus of our inquiry is, for the most part, technical.
That is, we are interested in knowing which notions of stochastically ordered demand lead to greater expected revenue. We do not focus on the precise mechanisms that may give rise to such changes in demand. Note that being able to compare expected revenues may also be important to an airline that is interested in assessing profitability in two markets of different sizes, but similar costs and fare structures.
Consider first a hypothetical example that helps to establish that a common notion of larger demand is not necessarily superior. This is a stylized example, which is intentionally kept simple in order that comparisons can be made transparent. More realistic examples will be discussed later in the paper. The airline in this example offers two types of fares for a particular flight with capacity κ = 100.
Class-1 customers pay fare f 1 = $800 and class-2 customers pay f 2 = $500. A random amount of class-2 demand, denoted as D 2 , arrives first, followed by a random amount of class-1 demand, denoted as D 1 . The airline optimizes its expected revenue by choosing a booking limit b, which represents the maximum number of class-2 seats to sell. Seats not sold to class-2 customers are then available for sale to class-1 customers. Since class-1 demand has not yet materialized when the airline must make class-2 booking decisions, there is a tradeoff between selling class-2 tickets, or waiting in the hope of selling those seats to higher-paying class-1 customers. We denote by ρ (b, d 1 , d 2 ) the airline's revenue when class-i realized demand is d i , i = 1, 2, and b ∈ {0, 1, . . . , κ} is the booking limit. Formally,
An optimal booking limit is one that maximizes the expected revenue Eρ(b, D 1 , D 2 ).
Suppose that in the base case P (D 1 = 100, D 2 = 0) = P (D 1 = 0, D 2 = 100) = 1/2. For any integer booking limit b ∈ [0, 100], the expected revenue is given by 250b + 40000. It is easy to see that setting b † = 100 gives an optimal booking limit, which yields an optimal expected revenue of $65, 000.
After a marketing campaign, the new demands are (D 1 ,D 2 ), where P (D 1 = 100,D 2 = 0) = P (D 1 = 0,D 2 = 100) = 1/4 and P (D 1 = 100,D 2 = 100) = 1/2. The marginal distributions ofD i are still two-point distributions with masses at 0 and 100. Observe that P (D 1 = 100) = P (D 2 = 100) = 0.75, which means that each fare class is likely to have a larger demand realization after the marketing campaign. [In fact, eachD i as well as the bivariate demand vector is stochastically larger than the corresponding base-case quantity.] Now, for any integer booking limit b ∈ [0, 100] the expected revenue is given by −25b + 60000. It is once again straightforward to check that the optimal booking limit iŝ b † = 0, which gives an optimal expected revenue of $60, 000. We see that even though larger demand is more likely after marketing efforts, the airline's expected revenue is smaller, even when the booking limit is chosen optimally.
The arguments above concern a fixed booking-limit policy. In a randomized strategy, the booking limit equals the realized value of a random variable X, taking values in the set {0, 1, · · · , κ}, with probability distribution p(x) = P (X = x). That is, the booking limit is b = x with probability p(x).
Given a choice of p(x), X is stochastically independent of the demands D 1 and D 2 . The airline's problem then, is to choose an expected-revenue maximizing probability distribution p(x). With a randomized strategy, the initial expected revenue function is 250E(X) + 40, 000, which is maximized by choosing distribution p(x) that maximizes E(X). The largest value of E(X) is κ, which occurs when we choose p(x) such that p(κ) = 1, and p(x) = 0 for all x = κ. Similarly, after the marketing campaign, expected revenue is −25E(X) + 60, 000. This function is maximized by picking p(x) that has p(0) = 1 and p(x) = 0 for all x = 0. That means the maximum expected revenue reduces from $65,000 to $60,000 after the airline successfully makes the demands larger. In this example therefore, it makes no difference if the airline considers using randomized booking-limit policies.
How can we explain the apparent anomaly in the above example? The remainder of this article contains formal models to answer such questions in more complex settings. However for this particular example, it is possible to explain the anomaly through intuitive arguments. In the base case, the demand in each fare class is perfectly negatively correlated. Therefore, by choosing the right bookinglimit, the airline is able to sell all its seats. In fact, the seats are sold to the higher-paying customers, whenever there is non-zero class-1 demand. After marketing efforts, the demand is more positivelycorrelated. Positive correlation makes it more likely that the airline is forced to choose between selling a seat to one type of customer, and selling the same seat to another type, which lowers profits. In closing this discussion of the example, it is worthwhile to point out that in addition to promotional activities, special events such as conventions and tournaments, changes in economic conditions, and upgrades can affect demand correlation (see Brumelle et al. 1990 ). Upgrades occur when some low-fare customers buy the high-fare ticket upon finding that the low-fare seats are sold out.
The situation described above is an example of a revenue-management problem, wherein a firm (the airline) controls the availability of products (low-and high-fare tickets) comprised of perishable resources (the seats) in order to maximize revenues. Extensive surveys of the revenue-management literature can be found in McGill and van Ryzin (1999) and Boyd and Bilegan (2003) , so here we will confine our remarks to closely-related material. For our purposes, the most relevant research is that in which customer classes arrive in sequential blocks for a single-leg flight -see, for instance, Belobaba (1989), Curry (1990) , Wollmer (1992) , Brumelle and McGill (1993) , and Robinson (1995) .
More recently, Lautenbacher and Stidham (1999) relate the research mentioned above with queueing control problems using a Markov decision process framework. Li and Oum (2002) also discuss and unify some of the earlier work. Moving outside the context of independent demands, Brumelle et al. (1990) analyze the effects of stochastic dependence between the low-and high-class demand in a twoclass problem. Additional extensions include research by Pfeifer (1989) , who models the diversion of customers from one class to another; Bodily and Weatherford (1995) , who analyze both diversion and overbooking; Weatherford (1997) , who considers an integrated pricing and inventory-control problem;
van Ryzin and McGill (2000) , who describe an adaptive procedure to determine inventory controls from past booking data; and Netessine and Shumsky (2001) , who study a game-theoretic version of the problem.
Our general approach in this paper will be to consider revenue management problems using a blockdemand setup. Within this framework, we will employ stochastic comparisons in order to identify properties of demand distributions that lead to higher expected revenue. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 considers two-class models where the demands for tickets in each fare class are dependent. We identify stochastic orders of demand distributions that lead to greater expected revenue. We also present a more specialized model in this section that deals with upgrades.
Section 3 generalizes the models to an arbitrary number of fare classes; in this more-complicated setting we are able to derive meaningful results only when demands for different fare classes are independent.
Section 4 contains examples and insights, and concluding remarks can be found in Section 5.
The Two-Fare-Class Model
We begin this section by formalizing the model underlying the example in Section 1. Recall that there is a single flight leg with κ seats, two fare classes, fares f i (f 1 ≥ f 2 ), and integer-valued demands D i .
The joint distribution of the random demand vector D = (D 1 , D 2 ) is given by the function H(·, ·), and the marginal distributions are given by H i (·); i = 1, 2. In addition, the conditional distribution of
Lowercase letters will denote mass functions; for instance,
and so on. The airline must determine the class-2 booking limit for use during the earlier period 2 -this limit places an upper bound on the number of seats that can be sold to class-2 customers.
Note that the number of remaining seats for sale to the higher class is at least κ − b ; this quantity is sometimes called the protection level for class 1.
We 
We will denote a maximizer of (2) by b † . For many references dealing with this model, see Section 4.1 of McGill and van Ryzin (1999) . In the remainder of this section we investigate, using stochastic orders, the effect of the joint demand distribution on
Before we proceed, we first review some material from the theory of stochastic comparisons (for complete details, see Shaked and Shanthikumar, 1994 or Müller and Stoyan, 2002) . For random variables X and Y , we say that Y is stochastically larger than
Ef (Y ) for all increasing functions f (·) for which the expectations exist. An equivalent condition is
for all increasing functions f : R 2 → R for which the expectations exist.
On an intuitive level the stochastic order (≤ st ) compares random variables based upon their size.
The example in Section 1 shows that "larger" (in the sense of 
, the optimal booking limit for demand vectorD isb † , and so on.
Viewed in terms of this notation, the example from Section 1 shows that it is possible to have
We provide three different comparisons. In Section 2.3 we consider a model that incorporates customer upgrades. In this instance, both the marginal distribution of effective demand (after upgrades) and demand correlation are affected when D changes toD. In each case, we identify properties that makeD more desirable than D.
The Effect of Dependence
for all x 2 ≥ x 1 and y 2 ≥ y 1 (see Topkis, 1998 for an extensive treatment of supermodularity). If the inequality above is reversed, that is, ≥ is replaced by ≤, then f is submodular. If the function f measures the "benefit" associated with the pair (x, y) and f is submodular, then the preceding condition can be interpreted as saying that x and y are substitutes; i.e., the defining inequality states that the incremental benefit from increasing the level of x is decreasing in the level of y.
, we say thatV is smaller than
whenever f is a supermodular function for which the expectations exist. From the definitions above observe that a function f is supermodular if and only if −f is submodular. So, an alternative condition forV ≤ sm V is that
whenever φ is a submodular function for which the expectations exist.
Loosely speaking,V ≤ sm V means that there is a stronger positive dependence between V 1 and
. Combining this observation with the fact that comparability according to the submodular order implies equal marginals, it follows thatV ≤ sm V implies
Müller and Scarsini (2000) provide a discussion of the use of the supermodular order in comparing random vectors. For additional background, see Nelsen (1999) or Müller and Stoyan (2002) . Applications in the revenue-management context are described by Karaesmen and van Ryzin (2004) , who use submodularity in their analysis of multi-class overbooking problems; and by Netessine and Shumsky (2001) , who employ submodularity to prove the existence of equilibria in a game-theoretic formulation. 
A 
The Effect of Marginal Distributions
The example in Section 1 showed that there are situations where stochastically larger demands lead to lower expected revenue. In this section we provide positive results in the form of conditions under which it is indeed the case that
These conditions involve the dependence structure between the class-1 and 2 demands. First, we need to introduce some more notation.
. Below, we consider cases where conditional class-1 demand distributions are comparable in the usual stochastic order, that is,
A random variable X 1 is stochastically increasing in another random variable X 2 , denoted by
is increasing in x for all y -see Nelsen (1999) or Müller and Stoyan (2002) for background. Others (e.g., Lehmann 1966 and Tong 1980 ) study SI under the name "positive
, and SI(D 1 |D 2 ), then these conditions together imply that D 1 ≤ stD1 . To see this, note that under these assumptions we have Brumelle et al. (1990) have shown that an optimal choice for b in (2) is given by
Therefore, expression (5) tells us that if SI(
in b, and hence b * in (4) is an optimal booking limit. Below, the notation X d = Y means that X and Y have the same distribution.
Proof. 
, the proof of part 1 now follows from the definition of the order
Turning to part 2, define φ(
Therefore, if we can show that φ(d 2 ) is an increasing function of d 2 , the proof will be complete by the definition of D 2 ≤ stD2 . To this end, we will demonstrate that φ(
. In what follows, we assume without loss of generality (see, e.g., Theorem 1.A.1 of Shaked and Shanthikumar, 1994) that
are constructed on a common probability space so that
with probability one.
With D 1 (d 2 − 1) and D 1 (d 2 ) so-constructed we have
We now verify that the expression in (10) is non-negative by checking two different cases.
where I(·) is the indicator function. In the above, (11) follows from (9), and (12) follows from the fact 
where the final inequality follows from (9). This completes the proof. #
On an intuitive level, in both parts 1 and 2 of the proposition (not to be confused with the two cases in the proof) the particular dependence structure allows an airline to realize the benefits of larger demand, while protecting it from any adverse effects. In part 1, the high-fare class has stochastically greater demand for each realization of the demand for the low-fare class. Such a change is beneficial to the airline for any booking limit, since it will sell at least as many low-fare tickets and more highfare tickets. Similarly, in part 2, due to the SI property, the larger demand for the low fare class is associated with larger high-fare demand. Therefore, larger low-fare demand is beneficial. In part 2, note that using a booking limit of either b * orb * when demand is given by (D 1 ,D 2 ), will give higher expected revenue than when demand is (D 1 , D 2 ) -regardless what booking limit is in effect for
Observe that part 2 of the proposition describes situations where stochastically larger marginal distributions are desirable [since (3) shows that under the assumptions in part 2, we have
Hence, apparent anomalies as in the Introduction cannot occur when the dependence between low-and high-fare demand is as described in part 2. Note also that Proposition 2 does not contradict the example in the Introduction. In the example the class-2 demand distribution changes so part 1 does not apply, and SI(D 1 |D 2 ) does not hold, so part 2 does not apply either.
Proposition 2 applies to situations where class-1 and 2 demands are independent. In particular, if we assume independence of the components of D and independence of the components ofD, then part 1 says that stochastically larger class 1 demand leads to stochastically larger revenues for any fixed booking limit. Similarly, part 2 says that stochastically larger class-2 demand yields higher expected revenue when the original optimal booking limit (corresponding to D) is used. These observations are also true when there are more than two classes of independent demand, as we will show in Section 3.
A Model with Upgrades
In this section we explore the effect of stochastically-ordered demand distributions in the upgrade model from Section 2.3 of Brumelle et al. (1990) . In this setting, if a class-2 customer is unable to purchase a low-fare ticket because the low-fare booking limit has already been reached, then there is a fixed probability that the customer in question will upgrade and purchase a class-1 ticket rather than go away empty-handed. Formally, suppose {u i } is a {0, 1}-valued sequence, where u i = 1 if the i-th class-2 customer is willing to upgrade if she is denied a class a class-2 ticket, and u i = 0 otherwise.
The revenue function is given by
[We define an empty sum to be zero.] Let {U i } be an i.i.d. sequence of Bernoulli random variables, each with parameter γ ∈ (0, 1), where u i in (14) is the realized value of U i . As in Brumelle et al. (1990) ,
, and {U i } are assumed independent throughout this subsection. The objective is to select b to (14) is increasing in d 1 and u i . Therefore, it follows immediately that stochastically increasing class-1 demand or increasing the upgrade probability γ (while maintaining the independence assumptions) will increase expected revenue for each fixed b, and hence will also increase optimal expected revenue. Brumelle et al. (1990) show that an optimal booking limit is given by
The following result shows that an analog of Part 2 of Proposition 2 holds in the upgrade setting. As before, we append a "hat" on quantities associated with the problem with larger demand.
PROPOSITION 3 Suppose that
, and γ ≤γ. Then,
Proof. The second inequality is obvious, so it remains only to show the first. In view of the comment regarding monotonicity of ρ after (14), we need only to focus on the case where D 1 d =D 1 and γ =γ.
Proceeding as in the proof of Part 2 of Proposition 2, it suffices to verify that
for each d 2 ≥ 1. Again, without loss of generality, we construct all random variables on a common probability space so that, with probability one, D 1 =D 1 and {U i } = {Û i }. With such a construction, to prove (15) it suffices to demonstrate that
We again consider two cases. If d 2 ≥ b ‡ + 1, then the quantity inside the expectation on the left side of (16) is non-negative with probability one, and hence (16) U i = D 1 , and therefore
By the fact that d 2 ≤ b ‡ , the independence of D 1 and D 2 , and the definition of b ‡ , we have that
This completes the proof. #
The Multiple-Fare-Class Model
Consider a single flight leg with κ seats and n ≥ 2 demand classes. In this model, demand classes are again analogous to time periods, since a different demand class arrives in each period. Throughout this section, we assume that demands in the n classes are mutually independent, leading to a Markov decision process (MDP) formulation. Many other papers that address the multiple fare class model have also assumed the demands to be independent; see McGill and van Ryzin (1999) for references.
At the end of this section, we revisit the independence assumption.
The MDP framework is essentially as described in Section 3 of Lautenbacher and Stidham (1999) .
[Actually, our formulation is slightly different from that in the Lautenbacher-Stidham work; however, it can be shown that both models give rise to the same value function and that there is a simple correspondence between optimal policies.] As we move closer to the time of departure, the time index decreases, so the first time period is t = n, and the last is t = 1. During time-period t, a random amount of class-t demand D t arrives. Each accepted class-t customer pays fare f t . Note that we do not need to assume f n < · · · < f 2 < f 1 . At the beginning of time-period t, the airline must decide how many seats to make available based on the number of seats that have been sold by that time. . . . , n, (19) with boundary conditions v 0 (s) = 0 and v t (κ) = v t−1 (κ). Furthermore, a policy that employs, for each s and t, a maximizer of (19) is optimal, and gives expected revenue v n (0). For the n = 2 case with
where D 1 and D 2 are independent and b * is given by (4).
Theorem 5 of Lautenbacher and Stidham (1999) (see also Robinson 1995) shows that
is an optimal action for state s at time t, where b * t = min{i ≥ 0 : f t < v t−1 (i) − v t−1 (i + 1)}, with the convention that v t (κ + 1) = −∞ for all t. That is, x * t (s) in (20) maximizes the right-hand side of (19), and the policy that prescribes the actions specified by (20) yields the maximum expected revenue v n (0). Lautenbacher and Stidham also show that for each t the function v t (·) is decreasing and concave, so
In Section 1, we saw that larger demand according to the usual stochastic order does not guarantee higher optimal expected revenue. In the example, however, demands in different fare classes are not independent. With the additional assumptions of independent demands and n = 2, Proposition 2
shows that airlines do realize larger optimal expected revenue when demand is stochastically larger.
In the sequel, we will show that when n > 2, stochastically larger demand according to the increasing concave order results in larger optimal expected revenue. This result allows us to conclude that stochastically larger and less variable demand are also preferred. For random variables X and Y , we
for all increasing, concave functions f for which the expectations exist; see Müller and Stoyan (2002) or Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994) . 
PROPOSITION 4 Suppose that
Then v t (s) ≤ṽ t (s) ≤v t (s) for all s = 0, . . . , κ and t = 1, . . . n.
Proof. It is immediate thatṽ t (s) ≤v t (s). Hence, it remains only to show that v t (s) ≤ṽ t (s).
The proof is by induction on t.
In view of the fact that ψ s (d) = f 1 min{x * t (s), d} is increasing and concave in d, for each fixed s, it follows that v 1 (s) ≤ṽ 1 (s) for all s, and so the result holds for t = 1.
Returning to the assumption of independent demands, our efforts to obtain results for n > 2 dependent demand classes have proved unsuccessful. Note that the proof of Proposition 4 relies on the optimality of the policy that uses actions given by (20) . Without the independence assumption, such simple characterizations of optimal policies do not presently exist; in fact, without independence, the problem is not an MDP. An alternative approach would be to simply restrict attention to booking limit policies, and to try to show that for any booking-limit policy, the revenue function is submodular in demand. This parallels the approach taken in Proposition 1. Unfortunately, it is simple to come up with cases for n = 3 where the revenue function is not submodular. In addition, our attempts to develop a different modeling framework that would allow meaningful comparisons based on some measure of dependence have not proved fruitful.
From a practical standpoint, the assumption of independent demand makes sense when the fare classes are segmented so that customers do, in essence, belong to a fare class. Historically, this has been a somewhat reasonable assumption. This, in part, explains why so much research and so many real-world models have involved the assumption of independent demand. (Of course, tractability is another reason.) Nevertheless, the emergence of the Internet as a distribution channel has made the booking process more transparent to many customers, and hence has served to elevate the importance of including some type of dependence in the demand model. In summary, it is an open question how to extend the results for dependent demands to more than two classes.
Examples and Insights
To demonstrate the effects of dependence we first identify classes of demand distributions that are comparable in the supermodular order. The comparison of copulas provides one method for finding such classes. A k-dimensional copula is a distribution function on the k-dimensional unit cube with uniform-[0, 1] marginal distributions. Nelsen (1999) provides comprehensive coverage of copulas.
Below, we collect facts from this reference that are most pertinent to our analysis.
Copulas and the supermodular order can be linked through the notion of concordance. Given two-dimensional random vectors V andV, we say V is more concordant thanV (writtenV ≤ c V)
In the bivariate case, it is known (see page 110 of Müller and Scarsini 2000) thatV ≤ c V is equivalent toV ≤ sm V. (For higher dimensions, this equivalence does not hold; however, we shall limit our discussion to the two-dimensional setting.) Greater concordance occurs when V 1 and V 2 are more likely to be simultaneously large, or simultaneously small. Intuitively, that also means that V 1 and V 2 are more positively dependent. As described in Theorem 3.8.2 of Müller and Stoyan (2002) , the concordance order is also related to the lower and upper orthant orders.
Suppose now that demand vectors D andD have respective distributions H andĤ satisfying
where H 1 and H 2 are one-dimensional distributions and C andĈ are each two-dimensional copulas.
Note that this is consistent with our earlier definitions of H 1 and H 2 , because, e.g.,
, where the final equality follows from the fact that the copula C has uniform marginals.
In addition, it is easily seen that
Therefore,D ≤ c D, and, in turn,D ≤ sm D. For details, see Nelsen (1999) .
So, by way of (26)- (28), random vectors can be compared using the supermodular order when
. A similar approach, taken below, involves considering a family of copulas
examples of many such families. Corbett and Rajaram (2002) describe how these ideas can be applied to problems involving aggregation of uncertainty.
Returning to our specific revenue-management problem, suppose that {D θ : θ ∈ Θ} is a parameterized family of bivariate demand vectors so that
where Θ is a set of real-valued parameters. For each θ ∈ Θ, suppose that D θ has joint distribution function H θ and joint mass function h θ .
For a fixed θ, we can recast optimization problem (2) as follows:
where
Let b ‡ (θ) = arg max b∈ [0,κ] For θ = 0 consider the two-dimensional copula
Such copulas are described in Chapter 4 of Nelsen (1999) -see equation (4.2.5). For our purposes the family (32) has several useful properties. Specifically, if
all u 1 , u 2 ; so, we can obtain different levels of dependence between components through the choice of θ. In particular, independence can be obtained as θ → 0, perfect negative correlation can be obtained as θ → −∞, and perfect positive correlation follows when θ → +∞ (see Nelsen 1999 for details and references). We assume that
akin to (26). Since (32) is not defined for θ = 0, we take
the case of independent demands. As detailed above, this construction gives us demand vectors that satisfy (29).
is increasing in θ (see comment in Section 2.1). Figure 1 shows the optimal expected revenue as a function of Corr(D θ 1 , D θ 2 ) for f 1 = 600 and f 2 = 150 and different values of capacity. As shown in Proposition 1, optimal expected revenue is decreasing as correlation (as measured by ≤ sm ) increases. For a particular value of θ, the value reported for expected revenue on Figure 1 is the result of simulating 25,000 draws from the distribution Figure 2 shows that as the dependence increases, optimal booking limits decrease. As the following result demonstrates, this is a particular example of a general monotonicity property. Note that the result does not depend upon the construction (32) and (33), and requires only that the problems be parameterized according to demand-vector comparisons with respect to the supermodular order as in (29).
Proof. By Theorem 2.8.3(a) of Topkis (1998) it suffices to verify that r(θ, b) is submodular in (θ, b) .
That is, we need to check that
2 are identical and furthermore, P (D
This completes the proof. # Brumelle et al. (1990) note that optimal booking limits decrease as correlation increases for twoclass problems with bivariate normal demand (see second column of page 187). Theorem 3.13.5
of Müller and Stoyan (2002) tells us that for two bivariate normal vectors with the same marginal distributions, the ordering of the vectors' correlations is equivalent to ordering the vectors according to the supermodular order. Therefore, Proposition 5 is in agreement with the statement made by Brumelle et al. (1990) .
Next, we demonstrate the impact of changing D 2 as described in Proposition 2. Two sets of examples are constructed. In the first set, we assume that when D 2 is made stochastically larger,
and D 1 is stochastically increasing in D 2 . Under these conditions, Figure 3 shows that the optimal expected revenue increases with D 2 . In contrast, when SI(D 1 |D 2 ) does not hold, Figure 4 shows that the optimal expected revenue is not monotone in D 2 . 
Concluding Remarks
Recent years have seen significant strides in modeling airline revenue-management problems. However, there have been no studies of the effect on an airline's optimal expected revenue of having a different demand distribution for one or more fare-classes, when the latter are possibly correlated. The need to compare different demand distributions can arise either when an airline operates (or wishes to operate) in two markets of different sizes that are otherwise similar, or when promotional efforts/exogenous factors simultaneously alter the demand distribution for more than one fare class. In this article,
we have used stochastic comparisons to identify situations where one joint distribution of demand is preferred over another. Our analysis has important implications for airline managers. For example, our results caution managers against assuming that a larger demand distribution is always beneficial. They also underscore the importance of considering how demands in different fare classes are interdependent and the importance of using optimal booking policies. When promotional or exogenous factors (such as the scheduling of a convention, change in national and international economic conditions) make demand stochastically larger, our analysis shows that an improvement in expected revenue is guaranteed in each of the following three scenarios:
1. Demands in different fare classes are independent.
2. There are two fare classes and their demands depend on each other according to a particular structure (see Proposition 2).
3. There are two fare classes, exogenous demands are independent, and some class-2 customers attempt to upgrade to class 1 upon finding that low-fare tickets are sold out.
If the stochastically larger distributions arise from a shift in demand induced by promotional efforts or external factors, airline managers may find it difficult to ascertain the exact timing and magnitude of the change, which would be required to compute the post-change optimal booking limits. Our analysis reveals that managers need not be concerned about being worse off so long as (a) one of the above scenarios applies, and (b) they were using an optimal booking limit prior to the shift. The fact that booking limits need not be updated to have an improvement in expected revenue (though proper updating will improve revenues even more) is satisfying from a practical viewpoint.
This article exposes a new area of investigation for operations researchers with many possibilities for future work. We believe a key open problem is that of ascertaining the optimal inventory control policy when demands in different fare classes are not independent and there are more than two fare classes. We plan to consider situations where this dependence arises from specific processes, e.g., a customer choice process which includes substitution (i.e., both up-and down-grading). Similar analysis could also help to evaluate the impact of promotional efforts that redistribute demand among several parallel flights offered by an airline between the same origin and destination pair. 
